Rice long dominated the agricultural economies of South-East Asia. Given the economic predominance of agriculture, the development of rice production had a significant bearing on the economies in the region. This article explains why the countries of mainland South-East Asia long dominated the international rice market. It quantifies labor productivity in rice production and argues that simple, low-cost and labor-extensive, but low-yielding production technology allowed farmers in mainland South-East Asia to achieve significantly higher levels of labor productivity than in the more densely populated rice-producing areas in South-East Asia and Japan. High levels of labor productivity were a major source of comparative advantage in rice production for Burma, Thailand and Southern Vietnam.
I. Introduction
As the main staple food, rice long dominated the agricultural economies of South-East Asia. Given the economic predominance of agriculture, developments in rice production had a significant bearing on the economies in the region. Therefore, an analysis of these developments can help to understand economic change or stagnation in the region. The countries of South-East and East Asia are often lumped together and typified by their main staple food.
1 However, substantial differences in the technologies used to produce rice, particularly in South-East Asia, are ignored in efforts to generalize the development experience of the region. In broad terms, but largely on the basis of China and Japan, Bray (1983; and Oshima (1983; 1987) argued that most of Asia was densely populated and that only irrigated rice could sustain high population densities because it produced higher yields than other staple foods. Such yields could only be achieved with high inputs of labor per hectare on small farms. For that reason, mechanization of agriculture and therefore large-scale agricultural production, as in Western Europe, was impossible. In short, rice production in Asia offered few opportunities for producers to reap economies of scale and higher levels of labor productivity, unlike wheat production in Western Europe.
Unfortunately, this thesis takes no account of the fact that, particularly in South-East Asia, population densities varied considerably and that farmers in rice-exporting countries were apparently able to produce rice more economically than colleagues in rice-importing countries, such as Japan. Hence, this interpretation is at best applicable to the densely populated parts of South-East Asia, rather than the rice-exporting countries of mainland South-East Asia. Few attempts have actually been made to quantify long-term changes in labor productivity in rice agriculture or to compare levels of labor productivity across the rice-producing countries in Asia. Such estimates help to assess whether Asian rice farmers were indeed unable to achieve higher levels of labor productivity. They may also help to understand the basic causes of the comparative advantage of the rice-exporting countries.
The next section discusses the position of South-East Asia in the international rice economy. Section III highlights the paradigms that have been used to understand the development of rice production technology. Section IV argues that not land productivity, but labor productivity is the key factor in understanding comparative advantage in rice production. This section uses disparate historical estimates of labor input per hectare to quantify the levels of labor productivity in rice agriculture in South-East Asia and Japan. The differences in labor productivity across East Asia are explained in section V.
For lack of space, several factors that influenced long-term changes in rice production in the countries of South-East Asia cannot be discussed here, such as the fact that rice and non-rice food crops were substitutes in production and consumption, land tenure, access to capital, postwar government market interventions and the organization of the rice trade.
2 For the sake of the argument, the present article focuses on the key factor underlying labor productivity and comparative advantage in rice production: production technology.
2. See Wickezer and Bennett (1941) , .
Figure 1 World rice exports, 1860-1999 (cumulative, millions tons of rice, 10-year averages
Sources: World production and trade: 1920-39, Wickezer and Bennett (1941); 1940 -49, The World Rice Economy in Figures (1909 -1963 . (Rome: FAO, 1965) 15 and 42; 1950-99, FAO Production Yearbook, FAO Trade Yearbook and FAOSTAT database (http: //faostat.fao.org/). Additional sources: Burma: Grant (1939) , Cotton (1874) , Siok-Hwa (1968) , Win (1991) ; Thailand: , Wilson (1993) ; Indochina: Bulletin Économique de l'Indochine (1925), Annuaire Statistique d'Indochine (various years). Figure 1 shows the continuous increase of rice exports from South-East Asia. Thailand, Indochina and especially Burma dominated the global rice market before World War II. After the war, exports from Burma and Indochina declined. Thailand maintained its exports, but did not increase its share in the world market until the late 1970s. Until then, China, the USA and several Notes: † Net imports of Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines, plus after 1965 net imports of the countries of Indochina; ‡ Only Burma, Indochina, Thailand, Korea, Taiwan, Japan, India, Malaya, Sri Lanka, Java, the Philippines and China. These countries produced about 98 percent of world output in 1950/51. § Exports of Burma, Indochina, Thailand, Korea and Taiwan only. Other main rice exporting countries, such as the USA, Italy, Spain and Brazil, would add 3-5 percent to total exports. (Taylor and Taylor, 1943) . ¶ More than 100% implies a net inflow of rice from outside the region, in this case largely from the USA to South Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia, following crop failures in Thailand in 1972 and 1974. Production in China estimated assuming 100 kg paddy per capita and population interpolated from 430 million in 1913 to 547 million in 1950; all paddy data converted to milled rice with 0.65 milling rate. Sources: World production and trade: 1920-39, Wickezer and Bennett (1941); 1940 -49, The World Rice Economy in Figures (1909 -1963 smaller producers, such as Egypt, Pakistan, Australia and Italy, took advantage of the expansion of the global demand for rice. Around 1860, the countries in mainland South-East Asia started a gradual expansion of exports, at the expense of traditional exporters in Asia such as Bengal and Java (Coclanis, 1993a,b) . The rapid increase of rice production in these areas was facilitated by the opening up of vast areas for rice production. In part, this was an autonomous response to the increasing demand for rice outside the region. It was also facilitated by the extension of colonial rule to Lower Burma and to Cochinchina, followed by government initiatives favoring the development of rice production. 3 The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 was not a turning point in the development of the rice trade. Rice exports from SouthEast Asia were mainly directed to South and East Asia, while the shipping of rice with sailing ships via the Cape to Europe and the Americas continued until about 1900, because it was cheaper despite the longer journey (Hlaing, 1964; . More relevant was the sustained decline in ocean freight rates during the 19th century due to the technological improvements in the design and construction process of sailing ships, and the gradual change to steel steamships with increased cargo capacity (North, 1958; Knick Harley, 1988) .
II. South-East Asia in the World Rice Economy
South-East Asia's share in the world rice trade declined after the 1920s, in part because Japan increased rice imports from its colonies Korea and Taiwan. Another explanation is that international cereal markets had become interlinked in the 19th century.
4 Table 2 shows that wheat dominated the global cereal market in the 20th century. Several wheat-producing countries introduced measures to protect their farmers from the impact of the global slump after 1929 (Taylor and Taylor, 1943) . International demand for wheat and wheat prices decreased. Cheap wheat replaced rice on cereal markets outside Asia. In addition, rice-importing countries such as Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines introduced measures to support and protect their rice farmers, causing a slight fall in intra-South-East Asian rice trade in the 1930s.
The gradual fall of South-East Asia's share in world exports continued after World War II up until the late 1970s, when Thailand started a rapid expansion of its exports. Figure 1 shows that instead of replacing countries that had entered the world market as exporters after World War II, Thailand has set the pace of the expansion of the world market at large since the late 1970s and was joined by Vietnam in the 1990s. Table 1 shows that the intra-South-East Asian rice trade increased significantly during 1950-75. Demand for imported rice even increased to the extent that rice had to be imported from outside the region following crop failures in 3. This followed the British annexation of Lower Burma in 1852 and the opening up of Rangoon for trade, the signing of the Bowring Treaty between the United Kingdom and Thailand in 1855, the French capture of Saigon in 1859 and the annexation of Cochinchina in 1862. The authorities in the three river deltas removed trade restrictions and took measures to enhance rice production. For a comparison, see Owen (1971) and Siamwalla (1972) . 4. See Latham and Neal (1983) and Latham (1986a) for an analysis of these linkages up to 1914.
Thailand in the early 1970s. The subsequent increase in intra-South-East Asian rice trade was largely due to the expansion of rice imports by Indonesia until the mid-1980s, when the country achieved self-sufficiency.
The reasons for the structural decline of South-East Asia's share in world rice exports during the period 1930-80, despite the postwar expansion of the world market, are complex. Heavy taxation of rice exports decreased the domestic profitability of rice production, especially in Burma and Thailand. In addition, world rice production increased at a lower rate than wheat production. Hence, on a world scale, consumers preferred wheat-based food products to rice. The difference in growth rates may also imply that technological development in cereal agriculture was skewed towards wheat production. 5 The following discussion will indicate that technological change in the main rice exporting countries of South-East Asia was indeed slow.
After World War II, the international rice market became very thin. Only around 4 percent of production reached the international market after the war, down from 8 percent during the interwar years. This caused a low price elasticity of world demand for rice, implying that the more the main exporters would have wanted to export, the lower the international price of rice would have been . Rice importing countries adopted policies to enhance rice production, importing rice only to balance deficits caused by adverse natural conditions. Therefore, there was a high potential supply, but a low and volatile international demand. These factors contributed to a high degree of price variability in the rice market and an increasingly lower degree of market integration Table 2 World cereal exports, 1909-2000 1909/13 1924/28 1934/38 1959/61 1969/71 1979/81 1989/91 1999/2001 (Cha, 2000) . Small changes in the balance between production and consumption in individual countries, especially in large countries such as Indonesia and China, translated into relatively big changes in supply or demand in the rice market. This differed from international markets for other cereals, especially wheat and maize. These commodities were traded in much larger quantities than rice and therefore determined the underlying international price trends for cereals. An increasing part of the world cereal market became dominated by multilateral trade agreements, in which rice and wheat were traded under conditions favorable to the parties involved. The rice exporting countries of South-East Asia were generally not involved in such arrangements, although several rice importing countries in the region received rice from the USA under favorable conditions. A related factor is the policies of agricultural protection in the USA and the European Community, which resulted in overproduction and occasional sales of considerable amounts of surplus cereals, particularly wheat. Such sales depressed the general real price of cereals on the remaining free part of the international market and reduced the price of wheat relative to rice (Tyers and Anderson 1992) . Consequently, rice-importing countries increasingly replaced wheat for rice.
III. Technological Paradigms in Rice Production
Why did mainland South-East Asia dominate the world rice market up to World War II, outdoing other major rice producers such as China, Japan and the USA? During the interwar years, the world rice market was relatively free from government intervention and was significantly integrated, particularly in Asia (Cha 2000) . Therefore, explanations have to be found on the supply side of the market: production and marketing of rice. Moreover, it has to be acknowledged that most rice was exported to other rice-producing countries in Asia, which suggests that explanations will have to be found in the comparative advantages that rice producers in mainland South-East Asia may have had.
Rice was grown throughout Asia in many different ways. In the past, the rice plant only dominated the swampy lowland areas of mainland Asia, but from there it gradually spread, reaching the eastern part of the Malay archipelago after 1500 and replacing roots and tubers as the main staple foods. Although largely grown in swamp-like conditions, rice became cultivated under a wide range of climatic and geographical conditions with a variety of different production techniques. It is possible to suggest that the choice of cultivation practices correlated with population density, but climate and geography were also important variables.
It is often argued that population growth and greater population density determined the choice of rice cultivation techniques. This has led to the perception that there is a mandatory sequence of technological paradigms in agricultural development of rice-producing societies, in which the prevailing production technique at a certain moment is indicative of population density and the phase of economic development. The ranking of production techniques is often in order of intensity of land use and runs as follows. 6 In underdeveloped areas with low population densities, random gathering of wild rice gradually gives way to shifting cultivation in a forest-fallow system. In this swidden system, trees are felled and burned and seeds are planted in the unploughed land using a dibble stick. After the harvest, the area is left to recuperate. The next phase in the sequence is a grass-fallow system of mixed agriculture. The fallow period becomes shorter, livestock is herded on the harvested fields and their droppings help the field to recover during the fallow period. A subsequent phase involves the sedentary cultivation of annually ploughed fields with a broadcasting technique. In the case of rice, the process of intensified land use has been refined further. In its most elaborated form, rice seedlings are transplanted from nurseries onto intensively prepared irrigated fields. Permanent irrigation structures enable multiple cropping. The intensive use of current inputs (fertilizer, in particular) on selected high-yielding and fertilizer-responsive rice varieties allow high crop yields. These are the main characteristics of the Green Revolution in rice agriculture, which spread throughout South-East and East Asia during the past 30 years.
The above sequence of technological paradigms is often accepted as an intuitive model of agricultural development in which population growth and the demand for labor outside agriculture (i.e. the changing opportunity cost of agricultural labor) are easily identified as the main forces driving this process. But it is questionable whether the sequence and, therefore, the dominant rice production technique in a particular region can be taken as a proxy for the stage of economic development. The main problem is that the sequence is, at best, adequate to analyze change in subsistence-based rice-producing societies that maintain superficial contacts with the outside world. Populations in most of the settled areas in the South-East and East Asian region have always been in contact with each other. Therefore, agricultural development in one country has to be analyzed in the light of agricultural changes elsewhere, because of the comparative advantage that some regions may have had over others in rice production.
IV. Comparative Advantage and Labor Productivity in Rice Agriculture
What constituted that comparative advantage? The production technique chosen and the combination of factor inputs it required are likely to have depended on relative factor prices, given the range of determinants, such as water supply, soil conditions, climate and rice varieties preferred by producers and consumers. For the sake of the argument it is possible to disregard the ecological differences 6. The different production techniques in rice agriculture have been described in much greater detail in Terra (1958) , Angladette (1966: 223-45) , Hanks (1972: 25-43) , Barker and Herdt (1985: 27-32) and Tanaka (1991) . The model of agricultural intensification is not specific to rice societies, for example Boserup (1965) and Clark and Haswell (1967) . between the rice-producing areas in South-East Asia, because the main conditions that determine rice cultivation, such as water supply and soil conditions, can be manipulated. For instance, water supply can be regulated with the construction of dams, canals and dykes. Water shortage can be overcome with irrigation from artesian wells or reservoirs. Soil fertility can be augmented with fertilizers. However, all manipulations require the commitment of greater amounts of labor and capital. It is, therefore, a trade-off between higher crop yields and a greater commitment of productive resources to rice production. The process of technological change in rice production can be assessed with the extended Ishikawa-curve shown in Figure 2 . The original Ishikawacurve only described the solid line in the chart. 7 The curve shows the paths of 7. Ishikawa's (1980 and original curve mirrored Figure 2 , because it had labor input per hectare (the inverse of the area of land worked per day) along the X-axis. Figure 2 is a new technological change societies may follow if they seek to increase total factor productivity (TFP) in rice agriculture or rice production with a given combination of production factors (labor, land and capital). An important reason for seeking to increase TFP (labor productivity in particular) is intrinsic to the process of economic development (Timmer 1988) . The demand for nonagricultural goods and services rises with economic growth. Producers of such goods and services will compete with agricultural producers for productive resources. Workers drop out of agriculture, but only if they are assured that they can purchase food at attractive prices. If food is not imported in greater amounts, workers remaining in agriculture will have to maintain or increase agricultural production, to produce the food surplus for the non-agricultural workers in exchange for non-agricultural goods and services. Increasing labor productivity or TFP in agriculture is indeed a major prerequisite for economic growth. In Ishikawa's interpretation of agricultural development in rice-producing societies, the path of advancement leads from a level of subsistence production upwards to higher crop yields (Y-axis), first with labor-absorbing techniques (X-axis), but gradually with techniques which allow more workers to drop out of agriculture and farmers to adopt labor-replacing techniques. During this process, societies cut across the isometric lines indicating labor productivity, which implies that rice production per unit of labor input is steadily increasing. Ishikawa (1981) compared the historical evidence on labor input and yields in rice production in Japan and Taiwan with similar evidence from China, India and the Philippines in the 1950s and 1960s and concluded: '. . . countries with the smaller per hectare labor input and per hectare output are found to be the countries where the problems of employment and rural poverty are the most acute'. Ishikawa presupposed that all developing countries have an unused labor surplus, which can be tapped by enhancing land productivity in rice production.
8
He concentrated his argument on the technological reasons why labor input was low in India and the Philippines and concluded that rice-producing societies necessarily follow a path of technological change in rice production similar to that of Japan and Taiwan during the process of economic development. This paragon dictates that a country will be in a position to mobilize an agricultural surplus in order to finance investment in the non-agricultural sectors and that interpretation of the curve, because it extends it with the dotted line. But it is not a new interpretation of the process of agricultural development in general. The 'extended Ishikawa-curve' is roughly the same as the interpretation of international differences in agricultural development presented by Hayami and Ruttan (1985) . The two differences are: (i) we refer to rice only, where Hayami and Ruttan referred to total agricultural output; and (ii) we consider the flow of total labor input in rice agriculture, where Hayami and Ruttan used the available stock of male employment in agriculture. Hayami and Ruttan (1985) presented a specific 'Asian path' of agricultural development. However, their sample of countries is biased towards the East Asian experience and excludes Burma and Thailand, for instance , which do not conform to this 'Asian path'. 8. Ishikawa (1967) elaborated on the analytical concept of 'surplus labor' of Lewis (1954). higher productivity eventually allows workers to drop out of agriculture to take up full-time jobs in non-agricultural sectors. 9 Ishikawa's findings helped to rationalize the commitment of governments of developing countries in Asia since the 1960s to public investment in irrigation facilities and the spread of high-input labor-absorbing technologies in rice agriculture, in what is generally known as the Green Revolution. Governments in all countries in South-East Asia engaged resources in the development of rice agriculture along the lines of the Japanese paragon. Some were more committed than others, which may explain the different rates of 'success' of the Green Revolution in South-East Asia (Hayami, 1988) . However, evidence on the actual paths of productivity change in rice agriculture shows that the countries of SouthEast Asia, despite rapid economic growth in recent decades, did not exactly follow the Japanese paragon.
The evidence is contained in Table 3 . It is necessarily patchy, because, apart from Japan, estimates of labor input in rice agriculture in Asia are rare. Still, the table illustrates the key differences between the main rice-producing areas of South-East Asia and Japan in terms of average yields and labor productivity.
9. Elsewhere, Ishikawa (1967) concluded 'Thus, the experience of Taiwan and Korea, together with that of Japan, seems to indicate that the technological pattern of productivity increase in Asian agriculture is broadly the same'. With some disclaimers, the Japanese case has been presented by several authors, such as Hayami and Ruttan (1985) , as a path to economic development for the other rice-producing Asian countries to follow. Notes: The basic data on labor input in rice agriculture are obtained from a wide range of local surveys. Unless specified differently in the source, labor input measured in hours was converted on the assumption that one workday equals eight hours. It is assumed that the average of several surveys for a particular period is representative for the entire area. Rice yields are averages for the whole country or region, generally obtained from national sources, converted to rice equivalents. 1 ton/ha equals 0.1 kg/m 2 . Sources: See Appendix 1.
Firstly, prewar Java and Tonkin were in similar positions as pre-1900 Japan. Secondly, Burma in the 1930s, Thailand during the first half of the 20th century and since the late 1970s, South Vietnam during the 1930s and 1950s, Cambodia during the first half of the 20th century and the Philippines moved in directions which were different from Japan in the past. 10 Thirdly, these countries managed to produce significantly more rice per day worked than Japan until the 1960s, Java until the 1970s, North Vietnam in the 1930s and prewar West Malaysia. Output was 15-17 kg of rice per day worked in prewar mainland South-East Asia, compared to only 5-7 kg in prewar Java, Tonkin and Malaya and pre-1900 Japan.
V. Explaining Differences in Labor Productivity
How could labor productivity in rice production in mainland South-East Asia be so much higher than in other parts of South-East Asia and Japan before World War II? One possible explanation is that the higher opportunity cost of labor, and therefore production costs in rice agriculture, in mainland South-East Asia necessitated a higher level of labor productivity. Although evidence is patchy, Table 4 indicates that it is unlikely that the cost of labor, and therefore the production costs of rice, were three times higher in mainland South-East Asia than in Java, Tonkin and Malaya. 11 The conclusion has to be that rice producers in one area, Java, for example, had to put a much greater effort into the production of the same quantity of rice as farmers in another area, for example, Burma. As explained below, the population densities in mainland South-East Asia were relatively low, which makes it unlikely that the cost of land was higher in mainland South-East Asia, while the use of current inputs in rice agriculture were limited in both mainland and island South-East Asia. Clearly, rice farmers in Burma, Thailand and Southern Indochina enjoyed a significant comparative advantage over their colleagues elsewhere.
Why was labor productivity so much higher in mainland South-East Asia, when low crop yields would suggest that production techniques were underdeveloped? It has to be acknowledged that Ishikawa's argument implicitly takes land productivity as a proxy for TFP and underexposes a much more important factor in the process of economic development: labor productivity.
12 This omission 10. Since the 1950s, the direction of the Philippines was a net result of a simultaneous expansion of rice farming in under-populated frontier regions, such as Mindanao, and the development of inputintensive rice cultivation in older rice-producing areas, such as Luzon. James (1978) assesses the implications of the simultaneous process for the analysis of productivity change in rice agriculture. 11. Wage rates of course reflect the marginal productivity of labor, which cannot be strictly compared with average production per day. But for the sake of the argument it is assumed here that both are comparable. 12. Ishikawa (1967) did not present estimates of labor productivity, although they are implicit in his data. They show, for instance, that gross rice output per day worked in a country with a low labor input as the Philippines was higher in the 1960s and 1970s than Japan in the 1950s, and that net rice output per day worked in Bengal in 1956/57 was higher than net labor productivity in Japan in 1950. 1920-22; m , 1911-14; n , 1925; o , 1931 . Where possible, five-year averages were used, of which the first year is given. Domestic prices converted to US dollars with current exchange rates and black market rates approximating the purchasing power of currencies. Sources: Data from a wide range of sources was used to compile this table. The postwar data are generally from ILO Yearbook, ECAFE Bulletin, FAO Production Yearbook and Palacpac (1991) . The most important additional sources are: Malaysia, Thoburn (1977) ; Thailand, Feeny (1982) ; Indochina, Murray (1980) , Bulletin Économique de l'Indochine and Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine (1932-41); Indonesia, Van der Eng (1996) ; Philippines, Statistical Handbook of the Philippines; and Japan, Umemura (1967) . Exchange rates from Van der Eng (1993) .
is important to countries with relatively low population densities, which, as Table 5 illustrates, the main rice exporting countries in South-East Asia were. Ishikawa's hypothesis prompts the question: Why would farmers in countries with relatively high labor productivity in low-input rice production adopt technologies which would have compelled them to work their rice fields harder, when the 'law of diminishing returns' would inevitably have confronted them with a declining marginal productivity of labor? A flaw in Ishikawa's argument is the assumption that there was a labor surplus in all rice-producing societies in South-East Asia, which had to be mobilized with labor-absorbing technological change as part of a strategy to further economic development. Given the substantial prewar inflow of migrants from India and China into Lower Burma, Malaya, Thailand and also Cochinchina (Latham, 1986b) , it is difficult to regard these areas as being troubled by surplus labor. That may, at best, have been the case during the off-season. But during the main rice season there were considerable labor shortages when, by and large, farm households required all available labor to cultivate and harvest as much land as they could possibly handle. This situation is different from the more densely populated areas, such as Japan, where not maximization of cultivable land, but maximization of yields was paramount.
Therefore, depending on relative factor endowments, there are actually different paths leading to higher labor productivity in rice agriculture, as Figure 2 indicates. From a low level of land and labor productivity, one possible path leads upwards, as Ishikawa conceived. Another possible path leads to the right of the chart, cutting across the isometric lines indicating labor productivity on the basis of labor-saving production technology. It may be obvious that both paths command different production technologies and that producers following different directions require different innovations to enhance labor productivity. In short, technological change akin to Japan in the past cannot have been a necessary prerequisite for the development of rice production in all Asian countries. By focusing on the land-saving technological possibilities of enhancing land productivity, Ishikawa and other proponents of the East Asian path of agricultural development may have neglected that the choice of a rice production technique is likely to have been determined by the relative costs of the main production factors, in particular labor and land. As explained above, ecological conditions can be manipulated, but such operations demand the commitment of more resources, such as fertilizer, fixed capital or labor. The adoption of labor-absorbing technologies depends on whether farm households consider it worthwhile to invest time and effort in activities which enhance labor input in rice production, such as the construction and maintenance of irrigation facilities or the collection and dispersion of organic manure. The direction of technological change, therefore, depends on the opportunity cost of available labor and land. 13 Low crop yields as a result of extensive production techniques can only pose a problem to a developing society if labor productivity is low as well. This situation implies that per capita rice production is low and rice supply perilous. However, Table 3 shows that areas with low crop yields mostly had high labor productivity in prewar years, and, therefore, the domestic rice supply is unlikely to have been jeopardized.
The most conspicuous difference between the main rice exporting areas in mainland South-East Asia and areas such as Japan, Java and Tonkin is population density (Zelinsky, 1950) . The top section of Table 5 shows that only Java after 1950 and, more recently, the Philippines reached density levels comparable to Japan in 1875. Concerning rice production, the bottom part of the table shows that only Java after 1925, North Vietnam after 1950 and the Philippines after 1975 reached density levels comparable to Japan at the time of the Meiji restoration. The implication is that attempts to further rice yields in order to maintain per capita production became relevant at a much later date than in Japan. An interpretation of the high densities shown in the bottom half of Table 5 for the Other Islands of Indonesia and Malaya should take into account that relatively large sections of the rural population in these areas were not engaged in rice production. Revenues from export crop production enabled these farmers to purchase imported rice. Table 5 shows that the number of people per hectare of rice in Burma, Thailand, Cambodia and Cochinchina declined up until 1950 . Given that production increased continuously in these countries, it seems likely that farmers in these areas expanded production by enlarging their farms where possible, rather than increasing crop yields. In fact, shifting the land frontier may well have led to a fall in average rice yields, because of the use of broadcasting techniques and the expansion to marginal lands.
14 However, lower yields do not mean that a 13. The relevance of labor productivity may explain why, in some parts of South-East Asia, rice production in labor extensive shifting cultivation patterns emerged after labor intensive wet rice agriculture had been developed (Hill, 1977; Dao, 1985; Tanaka, 1991) . 14. Ramsson (1977) elaborated this thesis for Thailand and Sansom (1970) for Cochinchina. Ishikawa (1967) did not ignore the presence of a land frontier. However, he suggested that in most cases, reclamation of reserves of waste land only happened in recent years under government-sponsored colonisation schemes and with state farms (p. 66) and therefore with subsidies. Secondly, on the basis of an example from China he assumed that the cost of clearing and cultivating wasteland may be higher than the conversion of land (pp. 67-8) into irrigated fields, a point later elaborated by Hayami and Kikuchi (1978a,b) for the Philippines. However, Ishikawa's conclusions were not based on a cost-benefit analysis.
comparative advantage in rice production was lost, because the crucial factor in such cases is labor productivity. Table 6 summarizes the main sources of changes in rice production and indeed confirms that up until 1950, the expansion of harvested areas explains most of the production increases in South-East Asia. This was in contrast to Japan, where up until 1970, increases in yields explain most of the production gains. The results in Table 3 imply that, in order to capture income opportunities in rice production, farmers in the rice exporting countries of South-East Asia successfully increased labor productivity by using production techniques different from those in Japan. 15 Instead of the usual hectare of rice for household consumption, a rural family in mainland South-East Asia produced a rice surplus by cultivating two to three hectares. In Japan, farmers increased surplus rice production after 1875 by increasing rice yields and in Java farmers increased harvested area through irrigation facilities which enhanced multiple cropping. However, in mainland South-East Asia farmers sought to use labor-saving techniques. Animal traction was used throughout Asia for land preparation, but the ratio of work animals and arable land was significantly higher in mainland South-East Asia compared to Japan and Java. In Japan, farmers largely resorted to manual labor to prepare their land with hoes or spades. They also cultivated seedlings on seedbeds for transplanting, whereas in mainland South-East Asia, farmers broadcasted seed onto the fields. In Japan farmers would fertilize their fields with human waste, compost or even mud from fertile areas and later with imported fertilizers. Fertilizing fields was practically unheard of in mainland South-East Asia. For those reasons, labor input per hectare in rice agriculture differed significantly throughout Asia.
The comparative advantage of rice farmers in mainland South-East Asia lay in the fact that they could expand their farms and continue rice production with traditional low-input labor-extensive techniques. Under the free-market conditions prevailing in South-East Asia until the 1930s, rice could only be produced with a noteworthy profit on such farms. The reason is that rice was a low valueadded product. Almost all farmers in South-East and East Asia could produce rice if they considered it to be worthwhile. However, given that land was relatively scarce, farmers in areas such as Java most likely preferred to use land and labor which was not required for the production of rice for subsistence for the production of other crops. In Java, other food crops and a range of labor-intensive cash crops indeed yielded higher net financial returns per hour worked and per hectare than rice (Van der Eng, 1996) . Labor was relatively scarce in the other rice-importing areas in South-East Asia and farm households most likely preferred to use any surplus labor for the production of cash crops with high net returns to labor with labor extensive techniques. Indeed, farmers in the Other Islands of Indonesia produced a range of crops, such as rubber, copra, Table 6 Growth of rice production in South-East Asia and Japan, 1875-1990 1875-1900 1900-25 1925-50 1950-70 1970-90 In the Philippines, many produced hemp, copra and sugar cane. A common characteristic is that most farm households producing cash crops did not neglect the production of food crops. 17 They continued to produce rice for household consumption. Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines largely imported rice to feed the urban and non-agricultural population and those working on plantations.
Technological change in the densely populated areas of South-East Asia was thus inhibited by low marginal returns in rice production under the free market conditions prevailing until the 1930s. This is in contrast to Japan, where technological change continued to enhance rice yields, largely because farmers were increasingly shielded from free market conditions through tariffs on rice imports and through input subsidies (Saxon and Anderson, 1982) .
VI. Conclusion
Supply-side factors appear to be paramount in explaining why the countries of mainland South-East Asia dominated the prewar world rice market, because they help to define the comparative advantage of these countries in rice production. The advantage was that simple labor-extensive, low-cost, low-yield production technology allowed farmers in mainland South-East Asia to achieve levels of labor productivity that were much higher than in the other, more densely populated rice-producing areas in South-East and East Asia.
This conclusion has repercussions for recent interpretations of the historical delay in economic development in rice-producing Asian countries, based on the suggestion that most countries were late in developing irrigation facilities and adopting the seed-fertilizer technology that seemed to have blazed the trail of development in Meiji Japan in the late 19th century. On the whole, such laborabsorbing technologies would not have been appropriate for the rice-exporting areas of mainland South-East Asia, as long as the land frontier had not been reached. 16 . For indications of the considerable profitability of rubber, for example, see Jack (1930) , Bauer (1948) and Lim (1967) . Other crops continued to be far more profitable than rice after World War II, despite government policies to boost returns from rice to farmers. See Black et al. (1953) , Huang (1971) , Taylor (1981) , Mamat (1984-58) and Kato (1991) . 17. In the case of rubber smallholders in the Other Islands of Indonesia, see Smits (1928) , Luytjes and Tergast (1930) , Luytjes (1937) and Bauer (1948) . Ding (1963) cites a study of Trengganu in 1928, showing that rice production sufficed to feed the family and was still cheaper than buying rice, but was not remunerative enough for commercial production.
